How times have changed! Three decades ago, George Tanham sneered at Indians for lacking a strategic culture. Today we have Mallikarjun Kharge quoting Clausewitz.
Yes, folks! Seeking a special session of Parliament to discuss the Pahalgam bloodbath and aftermath, Kharge said it was time the government came clean on both. To stress the point, he said, “The fog of war is clearing.”
‘Fog of war’ is a phrase derived from Prussian thinker Carl von Clausewitz’s On War. In simple terms, it denotes the predicament faced by commanders when events in the battlefield present a confusing picture. Gifted are those generals who see through the fog with their mind’s eye, foresee the enemy’s moves, and move own forces.
What sent Kharge on a Clausewitz track was the tacit admission by defence staff chief Anil Chauhan. He said in Singapore that though all fliers in Op Sindoor came home safe, the IAF had suffered some “initial losses” and that some “tactical mistakes” were made, but “remedied” and “rectified” in two days.
Shutterstock/AI
A thousand political blushes would have been saved if he had said this on Indian soil, to Indian leaders and to Indian citizens. No harm. To err is human, to forgive is divine. To err is also civil, to rectify is military. All militaries make mistakes, but they discuss those, and make amends. That’s also part of a vibrant strategic culture that Tanham was talking about.
What Kharge and co would like to know is this—what were the mistakes, what were the losses and, as Chauhan put it, what was done to rectify them and remedy them?
Asking for military secrets? No, by George, Jagjivan or Chavan! Losses are common in battles, and militaries in democracies admit them then and there.
Our own 1965 war saw Pakistan’s showroom-fresh Starfighters and Sabrejets shooting down four of our World War-worn Vampires and Mysteres on the first day, and a pilot flying a fuel-dry Gnat landing in a Pak airfield the next day. The 1971 round opened with 11 of western India’s air bases being smashed in three waves of vicious Pak attack. The Kargil war opened with two supersonic MiGs going down, and a mean Mi-17 downed by a puny shoulder-fired Stinger.
All losses were admitted then and there; they made news. The opposition didn’t fault the boys; the media didn’t shame the men; the news didn’t kill morale. The losses made our pilots revise tactics, the ground commanders double-guard the bases, the technicians cut the turnaround time of every plane, and a charged-up citizenry cheer them all. In no time, they cut the losses, improved tactics, and soared into the skies firing from all cylinders and gunpods.
Why are we holding back now? Do we fear that the loss of an armament would reflect badly on the choice of weapons we bought? No, sirs. A Rafale being damaged (the French forbid!) is no proof that we bought a bad plane.
Battles are won as much with superior tactics as with superior weapons. How else did our puny Gnats finally prevail over Pakistan’s dreaded Sabres? How else did our war-weary Shermans and Chieftains make graveyards of Pattons in 1965? And, most recently, how else did a much-reviled MiG-21 (pray, who called them flying coffins?) shoot down a much-feted F-16 in the post-Balakot mop-up job?
Strategic culture is about equipping generals to see through the fog of war. It is about coming clean on war errors. It is about enabling the citizen to cut through the clutter of propaganda. It is also about an informed political elite discussing and debating them in open forums. Which forum is more suitable for this than Parliament?
prasannan@theweek.in